Housing Market and Entrepreneurship: Micro Evidence from China by Han, Bing et al.
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Housing Market and Entrepreneurship:
Micro Evidence from China
Han, Bing and Han, Lu and Zhou, Zhengyi
Rotman School of Management at University of Toronto, Rotman
School of Management at University of Toronto, Shanghai
University of Finance and Economics
6 June 2020
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/102597/
MPRA Paper No. 102597, posted 27 Aug 2020 09:55 UTC
Housing Market and Entrepreneurship: Micro Evidence from China 
*
 
 
Bing Han, Lu Han, and Zhengyi Zhou† 
August 2020 
Abstract Using a unique survey data of Chinese households, we study the impact of 
house price growth and house price risk on entrepreneurship. House price risk, measured 
as the sensitivity of house price growth to local GDP growth, negatively impacts the 
entrepreneurship of homeowners relative to renters. This finding is concentrated only 
among sophisticated households and is consistent with the portfolio effect when housing 
and occupational choices are integral parts of the household portfolio. Moreover, a high 
past house price growth reduces the entrepreneurship of homeowners relative to renters. 
This holds for both sophisticated and unsophisticated households. We propose a new 
economic channel based on extrapolative belief and provide further supportive evidence. 
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I. Introduction 
Entrepreneurship plays an important role in job creation and economic growth 
(Andersen and Nielsen, 2012) by generating and taking advantage of business 
opportunities. Since housing is the most important asset for the majority of households 
(Yao and Zhang, 2005), business decisions and household decisions are highly linked 
(Wang, Wang, and Yang, 2012). In recent years, a growing literature studies the effect of 
house value on business formation, but the results are mixed and there are debates about 
the underlying mechanisms. Moreover, little is known about the effect of house price risk 
on entrepreneurship.  
China has witnessed remarkable entrepreneurship development since 1992. China’s 
economic reform can largely be attributed to unleashing entrepreneurship by removing or 
lowering institutional barriers to market entry and private business development (He, Lu, 
Qian, 2019). Entrepreneurship development in China is entering a golden era. Since 2015, 
“mass entrepreneurship and innovation” has emerged as the new national economic 
development strategy, and Chinese central and local governments are devoting tremendous 
amounts of resources to startups. A recent State Council document requires various 
ministries to lead or support entrepreneurship and innovation initiatives (State Council of 
People’s Republic of China 2017).  
In this paper, we study the effects of both house price growth and house price risk for 
future entrepreneurship using Chinese data. Over the past two decades, China has 
experienced a great housing boom (Glaeser, Huang, Ma, and Shleifer, 2017) that is difficult 
to be reconciled with the fundamentals (Han, Han, and Zhu, 2018). High growth rate of 
house price has been accused of having a negative externality on the real economy, 
especially entrepreneurship.1 The 2018 Report on the Work of the Government explicitly 
stated that “Houses are for living in and not for speculative investment”, which reflected 
the strong will of the government to fight against housing market speculation. Accordingly, 
the general upward trend was punctured by episodes of government interventions that are 
often local. As a result of such interventions, the growth rate of house price varied widely 
across regions, though the growth rate is still high overall (e.g. Fang, Gu, Xiong, and Zhou, 
2016; Zhou, 2016; Chen and Wen, 2017). These regional variations and exogenous shocks 
                                               
1 For example, on 27 July 2020, Economic Information Daily comments that high house price growth greatly hurts 
entrepreneurship (see https://www.sohu.com/a/409890430_120133503?_trans_=000014_bdss_dkmwzacjP3p:CP=). 
The article mentions that when the profit from real estate investment significantly surpasses the profit from business 
operation, it will be difficult for entrepreneurs to focus on business investment such as R&D and innovation. Established 
in 1981, Economic Information Daily is the earliest nationwide newspaper on economic topics.  
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provide us opportunities for identifying the causal effects of house price growth and house 
price risk on entrepreneurship. 
We employ a unique individual-level dataset that is particularly suited for this purpose. 
The 2017 wave of China Household Finance Survey provides detailed information about 
households’ housing asset, housing market expectation, entrepreneurial activities, financial 
literacy, and other household characteristics. Such information enables us to conduct 
refined test hypotheses for various types of households and differentiate among alternative 
economic mechanisms.  
We classify self-employed individuals as entrepreneurs if they view themselves as 
having started a business. This is consistent with Lazear (2005) who defines an 
entrepreneur as someone who responds affirmatively to the question “I am among those 
who initially established the business.” 
Our research is executed through several steps. First, we calculate house price growth 
and house price risk of each sample city. House price risk (Pro) is measured as the 
sensitivity of real house price growth to real local GDP growth, and captures the systematic 
risk of the local housing market. To the extent that local GDP growth is a proxy for the 
return to entrepreneurial activities, Pro also measures the co-movement between the return 
to housing investment and the return to entrepreneurial activities. Second, we run panel 
regressions for individual households’ propensity to start a business in a given year to 
investigate the impact of past house price growth and house price risk. To mitigate the 
endogeneity concern, we construct instrumental variables for house price growth and house 
price risk based on land supply constraint. Third, we conduct additional tests both for 
robustness and also to better understand underlying mechanisms.  
We are motivated by Bracke, Hilber, and Silva (2018) who consider a model of 
housing tenure and occupational choice. Households are assumed to integrate labor income 
and housing wealth in a household portfolio when deciding between dependent work versus 
entrepreneurship. They highlight a portfolio effect of housing market on entrepreneurship. 
They show that a higher covariance between house price and entrepreneurial income 
increases the overall risk of the portfolio and therefore reduces the likelihood of choosing 
an entrepreneurial occupation. Further, increased house price raises the weight of housing 
asset in a household portfolio. As a result, the household’s exposure to house price risk 
rises and its entrepreneurship drops.  
This portfolio effect implies that both house price growth and house price risk have a 
negative impact on entrepreneurship. But there are countervailing forces. For example, 
incremental house value increases lifetime wealth, which in turn reduces risk aversion and 
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encourages entrepreneurship. This is the “wealth effect”. The literature also emphasizes a 
positive “collateral effect” as increased housing wealth helps alleviate credit constraints for 
potential entrepreneurs by enabling homeowners to extract equity from their property and 
invest it in their business. Regarding the effect of housing price risk on entrepreneurship, a 
“hedging effect” can lead to a positive relation. In regions with a high house price risk, 
there would be a high correlation between house price and entrepreneurial income. Thus, 
entrepreneurship provides a good hedge against future housing costs, making it more 
attractive as an occupational choice. Overall, the confluence of opposing effects above 
suggests that it is an empirical question how house price growth and house price risk affect 
entrepreneurship.  
One distinguishing feature of our empirical work is that our test hypotheses focus on 
the marginal effect of house price growth and house price risk for homeowners relative to 
renters. We compare entrepreneurial activity of homeowners and renters operating in the 
same region. In contrast, most previous studies focus on homeowners and do not consider 
renters.  
Our first main finding is that past house price growth negatively affects the 
entrepreneurship of homeowners relative to renters in China. This is in stark contrast to the 
generally positive effects found within a developed country context (See Section 2 for a 
succinct literature review). Our second main finding is that house price risk negatively 
impacts entrepreneurship for homeowners relative to renters. Both results are consistent 
with the portfolio effect, because unlike homeowners, renters do not own housing assets 
and are not influenced by the negative portfolio effect.  
Moreover, we find that the negative impact of house price risk is concentrated only 
among households with high education level and understand the diversification effect 
(based on their responses to a survey question “Investing in multiple financial assets is less 
risky than investing in one single financial asset.”). This is consistent with the portfolio 
effect: for the portfolio effect to work, households need to be sophisticated enough to 
understand the diversification effect. However, we find a significantly negative effect of 
house price growth on entrepreneurship not just for the sophisticated homeowners but also 
for homeowners with low level of education and financial literacy (for whom the portfolio 
effect does not apply). Thus, the portfolio effect itself is not enough to fully explain our 
results.  
We propose an additional behavioral channel for the negative effect of house price 
growth on entrepreneurship that applies particularly to unsophisticated households. It is 
based on narrow framing and extrapolation bias. Some homeowners may practice narrow 
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framing, and consider housing versus starting a business separately, not as integral parts of 
the household portfolio as in the model of Bracke, Hilber, and Silva (2018). High past 
housing market returns lead households with extrapolation bias to optimistic belief about 
future housing market. Such optimism encourages households to invest in housing assets, 
thus crowding out their entrepreneurial activities. Consistent with this idea, we find that 
unsophisticated homeowners that are more optimistic about the local housing market have 
a stronger intention to purchase houses but a weaker intention to start a business. Moreover, 
we find that a high house price growth in another city would also lower the likelihood of 
local homeowners to start a business, above and beyond the effect of own city’s house price 
growth. This finding is consistent with the extrapolative belief effect, but it cannot be 
explained by the portfolio effect. The two effects are complementary, and we find empirical 
support for both.  
Our paper makes several important contributions to the literature. First, we are the first 
to document a negative effect of house price risk on entrepreneurship. Second, our study 
highlights important cross-country difference in the impact of housing market on 
entrepreneurship. We find that high house price growth crowds out investing in a small 
business in China, which is opposite to the evidence from developed countries in the 
literature. Our findings have important policy implications. Third, we uncover 
heterogeneity across households in the effect of housing market on entrepreneurship and 
multiple underlying economic rationales at work. We propose a new behavioral channel 
through which house price growth affects entrepreneurship and provide supportive 
evidence.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature, and 
Section III develops the test hypotheses. Section IV describes our data. Section V reports 
the empirical results including additional analyses aimed at better understanding the 
economic mechanisms. Section VI concludes.  
 
II. Literature review 
Most studies in the literature document a positive effect of property value on 
entrepreneurship and interpret the finding based on the role of housing equity in alleviating 
credit constraints faced by entrepreneurs. This is called the collateral effect. For example, 
Wang (2012) studies a reform in urban China that allowed state employees who were 
renting state-owned housing to buy their homes at subsidized prices. Wang (2012) finds an 
increase in self-employment following the reform, which alleviated credit constraints by 
allowing households to capitalize on the value of the real estate. Adelino, Schoar, and 
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Severino (2015) show that small businesses in areas with greater increases in house prices 
have stronger growth in employment than large firms in the same areas. They argue that 
the collateral lending channel for small business employment is important in the U.S. over 
the past decade. Corradin and Popov (2015) estimate that a 10% increase in home equity 
raises the share of individuals who become self-employed from 1% to 1.07% in the U.S 
each year. They propose that housing wealth helps alleviate credit constraints for potential 
entrepreneurs by enabling homeowners to extract equity from their property and invest it 
in their business. Harding and Rosenthal (2017) estimates that a 20% real increase in home 
value over a two-year period raises the likelihood of entry into self-employment by roughly 
1.5 percentage points in the U.S. Schmalz, Sraer, and Thesmar (2017) also find a positive 
relationship between house price appreciation and business creation, and support the 
collateral effect interpretation.  
However, the housing collateral channel could be confounded with a broader wealth 
effect that can also increase entrepreneurial activity. Specifically, a rise in housing prices 
increases the net wealth of homeowners, which may encourage them to take more risk 
(including starting a business) independently of any change in their borrowing capacity. 
To address this identification problem, Jensen, Leth-Petersen and Nanda (2014) exploit a 
natural experiment in which an exogenous mortgage reform in Denmark provided 
entrepreneurs with greater access to home equity lines of credit, thereby unlocking a home 
equity source of finance to start a business. They find evidence of a housing collateral 
channel, although the economic effect of the channel is relatively small. Similarly, Kerr, 
Kerr and Nanda (2017) find that housing collateral plays a role in business formation, but 
that wealth effects appear to be more important. 
There are also different findings regarding the effect of house price appreciation on 
entrepreneurship. For instance, Hurst and Lusardi (2004) show that U.S. households living 
in regions in which housing prices appreciated strongly are no more likely to start a 
business than households in other regions. Disney and Gathergood (2009) find little 
evidence of house price shocks unbinding liquidity constraints faced by the would-be self-
employed. Wu, Gyourko, and Deng (2015) find no evidence for the impact of real estate 
collateral value on corporate investment. 
Bracke, Hilber, and Silva (2018) theoretically show that the effect of home equity 
wealth on entrepreneurship is ambiguous because of two conflicting forces. In addition to 
the positive wealth effect, they point out a negative portfolio effect: a higher house value 
increases the share of housing wealth in a household’s portfolio, leading to more exposure 
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to the covariance between entrepreneurial profits and house values, thus discouraging 
entrepreneurship for homeowners.  
We find that house price growth negatively affects homeowners’ entrepreneurship in 
China. This is in stark contrast to a significantly positive or insignificant relationship 
documented by the literature. Our result is consistent with but distinct from Li and Wu 
(2014). Using data from 2005 Inter-Census Population Survey and 2010 Chinese Family 
Panel Studies, Li and Wu (2014) find that high housing price in general discourages 
entrepreneurial activities for urban adults in China. People are less likely to start their own 
business in cities with a higher housing price. Their main focus is on house price level, 
while we study the effect of house price growth. Different from Li and Wu (2014) and 
other previous studies, we also investigate the impact of house price risk on 
entrepreneurship.  
 
III. Hypotheses 
The relationship between past house price growth and entrepreneurship is shaped by 
several opposing forces. The collateral effect and the wealth effect result in a positive 
relationship. The portfolio effect leads to a negative relationship. These effects apply to 
homeowners, not renters.  
We propose another channel through which house price growth can negatively impact 
entrepreneurship. This economic mechanism involves potential household behavioral bias.   
More specifically, due to narrow framing, households may regard housing asset and 
starting a small business as competing investments instead of considering them together as 
integral parts of the overall household portfolio. For households with extrapolative belief, 
high house price growth in the past would induce optimism about future housing market 
which encourages housing investment and crowds out entrepreneurial investment. This 
leads to a negative relationship between house price growth and entrepreneurship. We refer 
to it as extrapolative belief effect throughout the rest of the paper.  
The extrapolative belief effect should have stronger influence on the financially 
unsophisticated individuals. In contrast, in order for the portfolio effect to apply, 
households need to be sophisticated enough to understand portfolio diversification. Thus, 
although both the portfolio effect and the extrapolative belief effect imply a negative 
relationship between house price growth and entrepreneurship, they can potentially be 
distinguished by examining the relation separately for sophisticated households and for 
unsophisticated households.  
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In China, the negative effects of past house price growth on entrepreneurship are likely 
to dominate the positive effects. First, owner-occupied houses are protected by the law. If 
a loan is collateralized by an owner-occupied house, the lender is allowed to freeze but not 
immediately sell the house in case of a default.2 This makes banks less willing to accept 
owner-occupied houses as a collateral, which weakens the positive collateral effect. 
Moreover, Wu, Gyourko, and Deng (2015) point out that no meaningful collateral channel 
effects can be expected in China because of the absence of the frictions (‘contract 
incompleteness’) that give rise to collateral channel effects in other countries. Second, 
given the large housing boom in China during our sample period, the extrapolation bias is 
likely to exert strong influence, causing households to herd into housing investment, 
crowding out entrepreneurial activities. Housing is traditionally viewed as a viable and 
popular investment option in China (Chen and Wen, 2017). 3 House purchase is even 
considered a “priority” for young people and their parents due to intense marriage market 
competition (Li and Wu, 2014). Therefore, our Hypothesis 1 is as follows: 
H1: Past house price growth negatively affects entrepreneurship choice for 
homeowners relative to renters.  
Regarding the impact of house price risk on entrepreneurship, the portfolio effect 
results in a negative relation. On the other hand, entrepreneurship may provide a good 
hedge against future housing costs in regions with a high house price risk. This hedging 
effect results in a positive relation between house price risk and entrepreneurship. The 
portfolio effect only applies to homeowners, while the hedging effect mainly applies to 
renters. For homeowners, owner-occupied housing already offers a hedge against future 
housing costs (Sinai and Souleles, 2005; Han 2008; Han 2010). This weakens the hedging 
effect of entrepreneurship for homeowners. Therefore, our Hypothesis 2 is as follows: 
 H2: The impact of house price risk on entrepreneurship is negative for homeowners 
relative to renters. 
Since the portfolio effect mainly applies to sophisticated households, we expect the 
negative impact of house price risk to be stronger for sophisticated homeowners. This leads 
to our Hypothesis 2a: 
 
                                               
2 See the legal document (in Chinese) at: http://lylcqfy.hncourt.gov.cn/public/detail.php?id=1369 
3 This is also likely to be the case in Europe, where many households see housing as a "safe haven" asset. While 
Americans tend to hold more stocks, Europeans tend to hold more real estate, especially in the form of primary 
residences (Musso, Neri, and Stracca, 2011). 
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 H2a: The negative effect of house price risk on entrepreneurship is more pronounced 
for sophisticated homeowners. 
 
IV. Data  
This section describes our data and key variables in the empirical analyses.  
 
4.1 Micro-level data 
Established in 2010, the China Household Finance Survey and Research Center 
provides micro-level data about household finance (Gan, Yin, Jia, Xu, Ma, and Zheng, 
2014). This paper uses the latest 2017 wave of China Household Finance Survey (CHFS), 
which covers urban households from 158 cities in 29 provinces of China.4  
 The survey includes respondents’ household characteristics such as the history and 
current situation of family business (if any) and housing assets (if any). It also contains 
respondents’ personal characteristics including age, gender, education, “hukou” type 
(urban/rural), risk aversion level, and health status.5 Their summary statistics are reported 
in Table 1. The definitions of the variables used in this paper are described in Appendix. 
The fraction of households currently owning a business is 16%, and it increases to 25% if 
those who used to own a business are also counted. The probability that a household owns 
at least one property (house or apartment unit) is 88%, and the average number of properties 
owned is about 1.1.6 A median respondent is 54 years old, female, with an education level 
of junior high school or lower, with urban “hukou”, married, not preferring projects with 
above-average risk and return, and relatively healthy. We focus on the urban respondents 
in our analyses. 
 In order to study the effect of local house price growth and house price risk on 
entrepreneurship, we need to merge the CHFS data with house price indexes. The National 
Bureau of Statistics constructs house price indexes for 70 large and medium cities. Of the 
158 cities covered by 2017 CHFS, 54 cities have house price indexes; of the 27,279 
respondents in urban area, 18,487 of them are located in these 54 cities. We further delete 
the respondents with mistaken records of house location.7 We also drop an observation if 
                                               
4 If we consider both rural and urban respondents, then CHFS covers 169 cities. Two provinces, Xinjiang and Xizang, 
are not covered by CHFS. 
5 The initial type and registry city of one’s “hukou” depend on the “hukou” of one’s parents. See Liu (2005) for more 
details about the “hukou” system in China. 
6 Our estimate of the homeownership rate, 88%, is close to the “90%” estimated by Glaeser, Huang, Ma, and Shleifer 
(2017). 
7 In the survey questionnaire, Question C1001 asks whether one owns the primary residence. Question C2009a asks 
whether an owned house is located in one’s residence city. Question C2009b asks about the city in which an owned house 
is located. If the three questions give conflicting answers, we delete the observation. 
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the respondent claimed to be a homeowner but refused to disclose the location or the 
purchase year of the house. Our final sample in 2017 consists of 16,215 observations. 
To make use of the longitude of the data, we transform the 2017 CHFS data into a 
panel data that spans from 2013 to 2017. This is achieved by using the information on the 
purchase year of a house and the starting year of households’ most recent business. A 
household-year combination is dropped if the household owned a small business but it was 
started in the previous years. We are able to mitigate the survival bias associated with small 
business because for the households who had no business in 2017 but used to have one in 
earlier years, we know the starting year and the ending year of the most recent business.  
Table 2 Panel A reports the average fraction of households that started a business and 
owned a house each year from 2013 to 2017. For example, in the year 2017, 1.15% of the 
households started a business, and about 83% of the households owned a house. The home-
ownership rate here is lower than the “88%” in Table 1, because we only consider the 54 
large or medium cities with house price indexes. In these cities, home-ownership rate is 
lower than in small cities. 
 
4.2 House price risk 
The macro and regional economic variables in this paper are downloaded from the 
Wind database and the CSMAR database, both of which are widely used by academics and 
the financial industry in China. The house price indexes of 70 large and medium cities are 
constructed by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS). They are monthly indexes. 
For each city, we calculate the most recent one-year growth rate of its house price index 
and denote it as HPIg. 
House price risk, denoted by Pro in the rest of the paper, is the sensitivity of real house 
price growth to real GDP growth, measured by the coefficient of RGDPg in regression (1).  
 
 
 
This regression is estimated using quarterly data starting from September 2006. The 
dependent variable (QRHPIg) is year-on-year quarterly house price growth rate of city c in 
province p, deflated by CPI. To compute QRHPIg, we first calculate year-on-year growth 
rate in each month, and then compute the quarterly average of it. The independent variable, 
RGDPg, is the quarterly year-on-year growth rate of GDP in province p, also deflated by 
CPI.  
, ,c p c c p c pQRHPIg c RGDPgb e= + + (1) 
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To capture potential time-variation in house price risk, we re-estimate (1) as time goes 
by including latest available data. The expanding window approach allows us to 
incorporate the boom and bust of house prices around the 2008 financial crisis. This 
estimation procedure is motivated by Adelino, Schoar, and Severino (2018). They find that, 
while house price expectations only correlate with house prices lagged one year, lagged 
house prices even three years prior to the survey still correlate strongly with perceived 
riskiness of housing.  
Figure 1 plots the values of Pro of the 70 cities in December 2016, against the values 
in December 2012. While the house price risk measure Pro is rather stable over time for a 
given city, it varies a lot cross-sectionally. For example, the Pro of Wenzhou, a port and 
industrial city in Zhejiang Province, is as high as 0.86 in 2012 and 0.94 in 2016. In contrast, 
the Pro of Kunming, capital city of Yunan Province, is as low as -0.33 in 2012 and -0.12 
in 2016. House price risk tends to be lower for larger cities and those with high house price 
growth. During 2012-2016, the correlation between HPIg and Pro is -0.21. The cross-
sectional variation of Pro helps us identify the impact of local house price risk on 
entrepreneurship. The large variation across cities in house price growth and risk can be 
seen from the summary statistics of HPIg and Pro reported in Table 2 Panel B.  
 
 
Figure 1 Distribution of Pro 
Note. The figure plots the value of Pro of the 70 large and medium cities in December 2016 against the value 
in December 2012. Pro is the coefficient of RGDPg in regression (1), which uses an expanding window that 
covers from September 2006 to month t. 
 
 
 
Pro (Dec 2012) 
Pro (Dec 2016) 
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V. Empirical results 
We first test the impact of house price growth and house price risk on entrepreneurship 
at individual household level. We conduct additional analyses for robustness and also to 
better understand the underlying economic mechanisms. 
 
5.1 Baseline regression 
Our baseline regression is specified by Equation (2) and estimated using the panel 
dataset we have assembled. The dependent variable is the dummy Starti,c,t where i, c, and t 
refers to household, city, and year, respectively. For a household i of city c in year t, the 
dummy Start equals 1 if the household started a small business in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
Note that by the construction of our panel dataset, the observations in year t consist of 
households that either did not own a business or started a business in year t.  
 
  
 
The key independent variables of interest are house price growth HPIg in year t-1, 
house price risk Pro, and their interaction terms with the dummy Own, which equals 1 if 
the household purchased a house in the city in year t-1 or earlier, and 0 otherwise. Our 
identification comes from city-level variations in house price growth and house price risk. 
Our results on the coefficients of HPIg*Own and Pro*Own cannot be explained by 
aggregate level (e.g., economic, political, regulatory) determinants of entrepreneurship, or 
personal characteristics that are correlated with occupational choices. We explicitly control 
for a vector Z of the respondents’ personal characteristics, including age, gender, education 
level, “hukou” type, health status, and the level of risk aversion. Following Schmalz, Sraer, 
and Thesmar (2017), we control for the interactions between Z and HPIg. We also control 
for the interactions between Z and Pro.  
Table 3 Column (1) shows the results of the logistic regression. The coefficient of HPIg 
is positive, whereas that of HPIg*Own is significantly negative. That is, lagged house price 
growth HPIg has a more negative relationship with the propensity to start a business for 
homeowners than for renters. Based on the regression coefficients, we compute the 
marginal effect of HPIg on the probability of starting a business, separately for 
homeowners and renters, holding the household characteristics at their mean values. The 
, , 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 4 , , 1
5 , , 1 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 , ,
*
* * *
i c t c t c t i t i t c t
i t c t i i c t i c t t c i c t
Start c HPIg Pro Own Own HPIg
Own Pro Z Z HPIg Z Pro
b b b b
b l l l q h e
- - -
- - -
= + + + +
+ + + + + + +
(2) 
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marginal effect is -0.47% for homeowners and 4.7% for renters. The difference is 
significant, with a p-value of 0.0003. Thus, H1 is supported. 
Moreover, the coefficient of Pro is insignificant, and that of Pro*Own is significantly 
negative. In other words, the relationship between past house price risk and 
entrepreneurship is negative for homeowners, but not for renters. These results are 
consistent with the portfolio effect which applies only to homeowners. Holding the 
household characteristics at their mean values, the difference in the marginal effect of Pro 
on the probability of starting a business for homeowners and renters equals -0.72% 
(p=0.01). Our hypothesis H2 is supported.  
 For robustness, we estimate a linear probability model as in Schmalz, Sraer, and 
Thesmar (2017) using OLS regression. The results, displayed in Table 3 Column (2), are 
consistent with those from the logistic regression in Column (1). For example, the 
coefficient of HPIg*Own is significantly negative. This supports hypothesis H1. For 
homeowners, an increase of 10% in house price growth is associated with a decrease of 
0.85% in the propensity to start a business in the next year. This magnitude is economically 
significant, given that the unconditional propensity of starting a business in a given year is 
1.34% over our sample period.  
 
5.2 Instrumental variable approach 
In this section, we address a potential endogeneity concern about the relation between 
past housing price growth and households’ propensity to start a business. Our research 
design partially deals with this possibility by comparing homeowners’ propensity to start 
a business relative to renters, and by employing lagged explanatory variables whereby we 
map house price growth in year t into the probability of transition into entrepreneurship at 
year t+1. Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile our finding with an omitted variable bias. 
For example, a local economic boom may stimulate both house price growth and business 
creation. However, this would suggest a positive relationship between house price growth 
and entrepreneurship, yet our result is exactly the opposite. Still, we address the potential 
endogeneity concern in two ways.  
First, we take advantage of an exogenous shock in housing market. At the beginning of 
2016, the central government and some local governments announced property destocking 
as a main task in 2016. On February 2, 2016, the People’s Bank of China reduced the 
required down-payment ratio. The policy was followed by abnormally high house price 
growth in some cities despite lackluster economic prospects. 8  The cross-sectional 
                                               
8 For example, the 2016 house price growth in Hefei, the capital of Anhui Province, was as high as 49%. 
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correlation between city-level house price growth in 2016 and the expected GDP growth 
announced by each city government is only 0.06 and insignificant. Thus, by focusing on 
the cross-sectional relationship between house price growth in 2016 and the entrepreneurial 
activities in 2017, we attenuate the potential endogeneity problem. When we repeat the 
logistic regression (2) using only the year 2017 observations (instead of the panel data as 
in Table 3), the coefficient of HPIg*Own is -5.18, with a standard error of 1.79. This 
confirms the results in Table 3 and supports H1.  
Second, to further alleviate the potential endogeneity concern, we re-estimate the 
regression (2) using the instrumental variable (IV) approach. Our IVs for a given city’s 
house price growth (resp. house price risk) are based on interactions between land supply 
constraint in that city and country-level house price growth (resp. country-level house price 
risk). The use of land supply constraint is motivated by two papers. Mian and Sufi (2011) 
use topology-based housing supply elasticity as an instrument for house price growth. 
Paciorek (2013) find that regulation and geographic constraints play critical and 
complementary roles in decreasing the responsiveness of housing investment to demand 
shocks, which in turn amplifies house price volatility. These two points also apply to China, 
where house price growth has been driven by land values instead of construction cost (Wu, 
Gyourko, and Deng, 2016), and house price volatility has been significantly affected by 
land supply (Deng, Girardin, and Joyeux, 2018). 
We measure land supply constraint by taking advantage of the 2006-2020 Land Use 
Plan.9 In China, the government is the only land supplier. For sake of food security, in 
2006, the central government set the bottom line for the size of arable land 296.5 million 
acres, and the quota was allocated to provinces. This determines the land supply constraint 
in subsequent years. The Plan proposed two binding constraints for the size of land that 
can be used for construction. The first is the size of “urban and rural construction land”. 
The second is the size of “urban construction land”. Then we calculate two measures of 
land supply constraint: ConAll and ConUrban, given by Equations (3a) and (3b). In (3a), 
Construct2020 and Construct2005 are the size of planned urban and rural construction area 
for 2020 and the size of actual urban and rural construction area in 2005, respectively. In 
(3b), ConstructUrban2020 and ConstructUrban2005 are the size of planned urban 
construction area for 2020 and the size of actual urban construction area in 2005, 
respectively. Among the 70 large and medium cities with house price indexes, ConAll and 
ConUrban are available for 69 and 67 cities, respectively. 
                                               
9 Each city has a Plan. For example, the Plan of Beijing can be found at: 
http://www.beijing.gov.cn/zfxxgk/110014/ztgh32/2017-10/19/content_3e34abc8087d4b4f96483b169e0a3a86.shtml 
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It is important to note that we do not use the actual land supply as instruments. Our 
measures of land supply constraint, based on the Land Use Plan, were determined for each 
city several years prior to the start of our sample period 2013-2017. Therefore, they would 
not be affected by local economic conditions during our sample period.   
We use the interactions between a city’s land supply constraint (and its square) with 
the country-wide house price growth (resp. house price risk) to instrument local house price 
growth (resp. local house price risk). Assuming a city’s land supply constraint is an average 
of ConAll and ConUrban, the first stage regressions of our IV approach are given below: 
 
 
 
In regression (4a), NHPIg is the country-level growth rate of house price, computed 
from the country-level house price index. Since ConAll and ConUrban are both time-
invariant, the time variation in the predicted value of HPIg originates from the national 
house price growth NHPIg. In regression (4b), Npro is the country-level house price risk, 
estimated in the same way as local house price risk using the national counterpart of 
Equation (1) by regressing country-level house price growth rate on country-level GDP 
growth rate.  
Table 4 Panel 1 reports the results from the first stage regressions. For example, 
Column (1) shows that for a given level of country-wide house price growth, the local 
house price growth has an inverse-U relationship with ConAll. This is consistent with 
Nathanson and Zwick (2018), who theoretically show that a house price boom is largest 
for intermediate values of initial land supply. Results from the F-test indicate that our 
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instruments for local house price growth and house price risk are valid and significantly 
correlated with the observed values.  
Table 4 Panel 2 reports the results from the second stage of the IV approach where we 
estimate the baseline regression (2) after replacing HPIg and Pro by the corresponding 
predicted values from regressions (4a) and (4b). In both the logistic model and the linear 
probability model, the coefficients of both HPIg*Own and Pro*Own are significantly 
negative. That is, both high past house price growth and high house price risk reduce the 
likelihood of homeowners to start a small business compared to the renters. Thus, the 
results under the IV approach support our hypotheses H1 and H2.  
 
5.3 Underlying mechanisms 
In Section 5.1 and 5.2, we show that both high house price growth and house price risk 
discourage the entrepreneurship of homeowners. In this subsection, we conduct additional 
tests to differentiate alternative explanations of our findings. To test the validity of the 
portfolio effect, we perform a subsample analysis based on the financial sophistication of 
the households. Then, to highlight the role of extrapolative belief, we examine the 
relationship between households’ expectation and investment intention. We also 
investigate the relationship between one’s entrepreneurship and the house price growth in 
another city. 
 
5.3.1 Subsample analysis 
As illustrated in Section III, the portfolio effect and the extrapolative belief effect apply 
to different groups of households. Here, we conduct a subsample analysis in order to 
differentiate the two channels underlying the negative effect of house price growth on 
entrepreneurship. To this end, we classify the households in the survey into several groups 
based on the education level and financial literacy of households. Households with “Low” 
education level (junior high school or lower) are separated from the “High” education 
households (senior high school and above). Regarding financial literacy, we make use of 
CHFS Question H3115, which asks about respondents’ view towards the statement 
“Investing in multiple financial assets is less risky than investing in one single financial 
asset.” If a respondent agrees with it, then the household intuitively understands portfolio 
diversification benefit and is labeled as “Correct”; otherwise, the household is labeled as 
“Incorrect”. Then we classify households into four groups: High-Correct, High-Incorrect, 
Low-Correct, and Low-Incorrectly. Such double-sorting helps us mitigate the concern that 
some respondent correctly answered Question H3115 by chance. The portfolio effect is 
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expected to influence mainly the financially sophisticated households (i.e., the High-
Correct group).  
We repeat the baseline regression separately for each of the four groups of households. 
The results are reported in Table 5. The coefficient of Pro*Own is significantly negative 
for the High-Correct group, but insignificant for the other three groups. This supports H2a, 
and suggests that the portfolio effect plays a key role for the negative effect of house price 
risk on entrepreneurship, which is significant only in the cases of sophisticated 
homeowners. This is consistent with the intuition that unsophisticated homeowners do not 
manage household risk in a portfolio sense and thus are not subject to the portfolio effect 
in Bracke, Hilber, and Silva (2018).  
In contrast, the coefficient of HPIg*Own is significantly negative not just for the High-
Correct group, but also for the Low-incorrect group. In fact, the estimated coefficient of 
HPIg*Own is the largest for the Low-incorrect group. Since the portfolio effect should not 
play an important role for these unsophisticated homeowners, we can infer that there are 
alternative mechanisms underlying the negative impact of housing price growth on 
entrepreneurship.  
In summary, the negative impact of house price risk concentrates among sophisticated 
homeowners and works through the portfolio effect. But the portfolio effect cannot be the 
only mechanism underlying the negative relation between past house price growth and 
entrepreneurship because this relation applies to both sophisticated and unsophisticated 
homeowners. We explore the extrapolative belief effect in the next subsection and show 
that it can explain the strong negative impact of past housing price growth on 
entrepreneurship for unsophisticated homeowners.   
 
5.3.2 Subjective expectations and investment intentions 
In this subsection, we conduct several tests using the 2017 Beijing subsample of CHFS 
to illustrate the importance of extrapolative beliefs about local housing market for 
households’ entrepreneurship decision. By focusing on survey respondents in the same city, 
we effectively hold fixed house price growth so that variation in households’ propensity to 
start a business documented here cannot be explained by the wealth effect, collateral effect 
and portfolio effect since these effects work through house price growth. We focus on 
Beijing because of the availability of a direct measure of Beijing households’ subjective 
belief about the local housing market. 
In the 2017 wave of CHFS, there are some city-specific questions. Question C1000bj 
in the Beijing survey asks the respondents about their expectation for the local house price 
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growth over the next year. The answer ranges from 1 (very optimistic) to 5 (very 
pessimistic). We multiple the answer by -1, and denote it as Optimism. The variation of 
Optimism reflects people’s heterogeneous belief about the local housing market, given that 
city and time are both fixed. Optimism can be viewed as a proxy for extrapolative belief. 
Since the Beijing house price increased by 37% in 2016, households with extrapolative 
belief would display high Optimism in 2017.  
The survey also asks non-entrepreneurs about their intention to start a business. Using 
the Beijing subsample, we run the following logistic regression to examine the effect of 
Optimism on households’ intention to start a business: 
 
The dependent variable Willstart is a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent intends to 
start a business, and 0 otherwise. The key independent variable of interest is the interaction 
Optimism with Own. We control for the same vector Z of household characteristics as in 
regression (2). We also control for the interaction between Z and Optimism. Entrepreneurs 
are excluded from this regression because CHFS only asks non-entrepreneurs about their 
intention to start a business. 
Table 6 Column (1) reports the results of the regression given in Equation (5). The 
coefficient of Own*Optimism is significantly negative. All homeowners in the regression 
(5) experience the same large house price increase in the previous year, but some of them 
have extrapolative belief and display high Optimism. These extrapolative belief households 
are less likely to start a business, according to the significantly negative coefficient of 
Own*Optimism. This finding highlights the important influence of extrapolative belief on 
entrepreneurship, even holding constant past house price growth. 
We also perform subsample analyses. We divide the Beijing sample into two groups 
according to the respondents’ answer to question H3115, and run the logistic regression (5) 
separately for each group. The results are reported in Table 6 Columns (2) and (3). In 
Columns (4) and (5), we divide the Beijing sample into two groups according to the 
respondent’s education level. We find that Optimism is associated with a lower planned 
entrepreneurship for unsophisticated homeowners (those with low education level and do 
not understand diversification). This result can explain the finding in Table 5 that house 
price growth has a significantly negative effect on entrepreneurship for unsophisticated 
homeowners: a high past house price growth leads to optimism about future housing market 
1 2 3
*
*
i i i i i i
i i i
Willstart c Own Optimism Own Optimism Z
Z Optimism
b b b l
e
= + + + +
+ +
(5) 
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due to the extrapolation belief, and the optimism reduces the probability of starting a 
business according to the result in Table 6.  
Interestingly, Table 6 shows that sophisticated homeowners are able to rein in their 
optimism about future housing market and do not let it significantly affect the decision of 
starting a business. This suggests that extrapolative belief has little influence on the 
entrepreneurship of sophisticated homeowners. Table 5 indicates a significantly negative 
effect of past house price growth on the propensity to start a business even for sophisticated 
homeowners. This finding cannot be attributed to the influence of extrapolative belief. It 
is, however, consistent with the portfolio effect (see Section 5.3.1). Therefore, we conclude 
that both portfolio effect and extrapolative belief play an important role in explaining the 
negative relation between entrepreneurship and past local house price growth.  
Next, we repeat the logistic regression in Equation (5) but replace Willstart with 
Willbuy. Here Willbuy is a dummy that equals 1 if a household intends to buy or build a 
house, and 0 otherwise. The results are shown in Table 6 Column (6). The coefficient of 
Optimism is significantly negative, suggesting that renters who are more optimistic about 
future local housing market actually tend to have a weaker intention to buy a house. This 
seemingly surprising result reflects the housing (un)affordability issue. Renters are 
relatively poor. Because of the high required down-payment ratio,10 a higher house price 
would make house purchase more out of reach for the renters and discourage them from 
entering the housing market. In contrast, the coefficient of Own*Optimism is significantly 
positive, so optimistic homeowners are more likely to purchase additional houses. This 
suggests that the homeowners in China do not face binding credit constraints (e.g., they 
can borrow using the existing house as collateral).  
 To summarize, Table 6 shows that for homeowners, optimism towards the housing 
market weakens the intention to start a business but enhances the intention to buy more 
houses. The negative effect of optimism toward housing market on entrepreneurship 
applies mainly to the unsophisticated households who seem to treat housing investment 
and small business as competing investments. Because of extrapolative belief, high past 
house price growth encourages households to invest in housing assets, thus crowding out 
their entrepreneurial activities. 
 
 
 
                                               
10 In Shanghai, for example, the government stipulates that the down-payment ratio is at least 35% for households with 
no houses in the city. 
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5.3.3 The effect of house price growth in another city 
In this subsection, we differentiate the extrapolative belief effect from alternative 
effects studied in the literature by examining the influence of house price growth in other 
cities on entrepreneurship. The wealth effect, the collateral effect, and the portfolio effect 
have one thing in common: they all work through the value of one’s own housing asset, 
and therefore imply no relation between a homeowner’s entrepreneurship and house price 
growth in another city (to the extent it is uncorrelated with resident city house price growth). 
In contrast, for someone with extrapolative belief, high house price growth in a different 
city may increase one’s optimism towards the local housing market and thus reduce the 
probability of starting a business, even if the local house price growth has been low. For 
example, if two cities are closely linked via friendship or business networks, then residents 
in one city are likely to hear about the housing market performance of the other city.  
We focus on links between cities via high-speed rail (HSR) trains. It has been well 
documented in the literature that HSR links facilitate communication and interaction of 
people from different cities (e.g. Dong, Zheng, and Kahn, 2020). For a city c, the city that 
shares the largest number of high-speed rail trains with city c is classified as its connected 
city. 11  
The average correlation of house price growth between each of the 54 sample cities 
and its connected city is 0.57. To capture house price growth of the connected city that is 
uncorrelated with own city c in year t, we regress the house price growth rate of the 
connected city on the growth rate of city c, using the historical data from 2006 to year t. 
The residual is denoted as HPIgM and represents the unexpected or abnormal house price 
growth in city c’s connected city that cannot be explained by the house price growth in city 
c based on their historical co-movements.  
We run the following regression (6) that expands regression (2) by adding HPIgM as 
well as its interaction with homeowner dummy Own: 
 
 
Table 7 Column (1) shows that the coefficient of Own*HPIg is still significantly 
negative. Moreover, the coefficient of Own*HPIgM is also significantly negative, though 
the magnitude is smaller than that of Own*HPIg. That is, after accounting for the negative 
                                               
11 We use the timetable in July 2014, the earliest electronic timetable available to us. For cities that were not connected 
to HSR at that time, we could not assign a connected city. Therefore, we omit observations of survey respondents from 
these cities (about 11% of the sample) when estimating the regression (6). 
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effect of own city’s house price growth on local entrepreneurship, an unexpected high 
house price growth in the connected city would also lower the likelihood of local 
homeowners to start a business. This finding is consistent with the extrapolative belief 
effect, but it cannot be explained by the wealth effect, the collateral effect, or the portfolio 
effect studied in the literature. 
In Table 7 Columns (2) and (3), we divide the sample into two according to the sign 
of HPIgM and re-run the regression (6) separately on each subsample. In the subsample of 
positive HPIgM (i.e., when the connected city’s house price growth is abnormally high), 
the coefficient of Own*HPIgM is significantly negative while the coefficient of Own*HPIg 
is negative but no longer significant, as shown in Table 7 Column (3). The opposite is true 
for the subsample of negative HPIgM: in Column (2), the coefficient of Own*HPIgM is 
negative but not significantly different from zero, while the coefficient of Own*HPIg is 
significantly negative. Therefore, the connected city’s past house price growth has a 
negative effect on local entrepreneurship mainly when it is unusually high. Positive 
performance is more salient and likely communicated more, thereby exerting influences on 
extrapolators’ beliefs. In contrast, people might not be aware of or pay attention to poor 
housing market in other cities. Their belief about housing market is mainly shaped by own 
city’s experience when the connected city’s residual house price growth is negative. Hence, 
the findings in Table 7 can be explained under extrapolative belief, but they are difficult to 
reconcile with under alternative explanations.  
In an unreported test, we find a similar negative relation between local 
entrepreneurship and the past house price growth of a geographically neighboring city. The 
results in this subsection provide further evidence on the important influence of 
extrapolative belief in the housing market on entrepreneurship.  
 
5.3.4 Homeowners with houses in non-residence cities 
In 2017 CHFS, there are 909 homeowners whose houses were all in non-residence 
cities. We create a panel dataset that include only renters and these homeowners (i.e., we 
exclude households that own homes in their resident cities), and then rerun the baseline 
regression (1). The results are displayed in Table 8. This test would further distinguish the 
extrapolative belief effect from the wealth effect, collateral effect, and portfolio effect. 
Regarding homeowners whose houses are not in the residence city, the most likely scenario 
is that one leaves a small-city hometown for a larger city (e.g. more job opportunities). 
Since houses in small cities are lower priced and have lower appreciations, and since the 
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correlation in house price growth between the resident city and home city is low,12 we 
expect that the wealth effect, collateral effect, and portfolio effect would be weak at best 
for these homeowners. In contrast, under extrapolative belief, a high house price growth of 
the resident city would still have a significantly negative effect on households’ 
entrepreneurship decision even if the households have not benefited from the housing 
appreciation.  
Table 8 shows that the coefficient of Pro*Own is negative but insignificant in both the 
logistic and the OLS regression. This suggests that local house price risk does not 
significantly impact the entrepreneurship decision of households who own houses but not 
in the resident city. The portfolio effect is insignificant for this subsample of households. 
On the other hand, the coefficient of HPIg*Own is significantly negative in both the logistic 
and the OLS regression. This provides additional evidence for the extrapolative belief 
effect.  
 
5.4 Placebo test  
As a placebo test, we match each of the 54 sample cities with a randomly selected city 
from the 70 cities that have house price indexes. To do the matching, we use simulation 
and sample without replacement. We denote the house price growth and house price risk 
of the matched city by HPIgS and ProS. We repeat the baseline regression in Equation (2) 
after replacing HPIg and Pro with HPIgS and ProS. This exercise is repeated 1,000 times.  
Table 9 reports the average coefficient, average standard error, average t-value, and 
average p-value across the 1000 simulated regressions, for the linear probability model (the 
results for the logistic are similar and omitted). The average coefficient of HPIgS*Own is 
a magnitude lower than that in Table 3 Column (2). The coefficient of ProS*Own is even 
smaller compared to the actual coefficient we find in the data. The last column of Table 9 
shows that in only 5.8% of the 1000 simulated regressions, the entrepreneurship of 
homeowners in a given city is negatively (significant at 5% level) related to house price 
growth of a randomly picked city. Further, in only 0.3% of the regressions using simulated 
data, the coefficient of HPIgS*Own is significant at 5% level and has a magnitude that is 
the same or larger than in Table 3 Column (2). Similarly, the odd is low (only about 14%) 
that a randomly reshuffled data can lead to a significantly negative relation between 
homeowners’ entrepreneurship and local housing market risk. In only 8.4% of the 
                                               
12 According to Wind database, from June 2010 to December 2017, the cumulative house price growth in first-tier, 
second-tier, and third-tier cities was 98%, 47%, and 30%, respectively. We find that the house price correlation between 
one’s residence city and the city where one’s houses are located is 0.4.  
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regressions, the coefficient of ProS*Own is significant at 5% level and has a magnitude that 
is the same or larger than in Table 3 Column (2). Therefore, the significantly negative 
coefficients of Own*HPIg and Pro*Own documented in Table 3 are unlikely to be 
statistical fluke.  
 
6 Conclusions 
Using data from the 2017 wave of China Household Finance Survey, we show that 
house price growth and house price risk both significantly and negatively impact the 
entrepreneurship of homeowners relative to renters. We are the first to empirically 
document the negative impact of house price risk on local entrepreneurship. This finding 
can be explained by the portfolio effect (Bracke, Hilber, and Silva, 2018). Consistent with 
the intuition that unsophisticated homeowners do not manage household risk as an integral 
portfolio and thus are not subject to influence of the portfolio effect, we find that the 
negative effect of house price risk on entrepreneurship is significant only for sophisticated 
homeowners with high education level and financial literacy.  
On the other hand, the negative relation between past house price growth and 
entrepreneurship holds both for sophisticated and unsophisticated homeowners. The 
portfolio effect is insufficient to fully explain the negative impact of house price growth on 
entrepreneurship of homeowners. We propose and find support for an additional channel 
based on extrapolative belief. That is, households regard housing asset and small business 
as competing investments. When the past house price growth is high, extrapolative 
households form optimistic expectation about the housing investment which decreases 
their propensity to start a business.   
The negative relation between house price growth and homeowners’ entrepreneurship 
in China is opposite to the generally positive effects found in developed markets. It 
confirms a negative externality of a hot housing market on the real economy. This together 
with the negative effect of house price risk on entrepreneurship have important policy 
implications. In order to promote entrepreneurial activities and economic growth, the 
government and policy makers should strive to maintain a stable housing market and curb 
speculative housing bubble.  
This paper can be extended in several ways. For example, it is meaningful to 
investigate the implication of house price growth for the general quality of entrepreneurs. 
In the past decades, China experienced a persistent housing boom, which makes housing 
investment highly profitable. In such an environment, some individuals still decided to start 
a business instead of buying a house. It is possible that such entrepreneurs are sophisticated 
 
 
23 
and free of extrapolative belief. It is also possible that they have extraordinary business 
opportunities. Then we can test if entrepreneurs in regions with a more prosperous housing 
market typically generate better entrepreneurial outcomes. Another possible extension is 
to examine how firm policies such as innovations and investments depend on local housing 
market conditions.  
 
 
24 
Reference 
[1] Adelino, M., Schoar, A., & Severino, F. (2015). House prices, collateral, and self-
employment. Journal of Financial Economics, 117(2), 288-306. https://doi: 
10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.03.005 
[2] Adelino, M., Schoar, A., & Severino, F. (2018). Perception of house price risk and 
homeownership. NBER Working Paper No. 25090. 
[3] Andersen, S., & Nielsen, K. M. (2012). Ability or finances as constraints on 
entrepreneurship? Evidence from survival rates in a natural experiment. The Review 
of Financial Studies, 25(12), 3684-3710. https://doi: 10.1093/rfs/hhs107 
[4] Bracke, P., Hilber, C. A. L., & Silva, O. (2018). Mortgage debt and entrepreneurship. 
Journal of Urban Economics, 103, 52-66. https://doi: 10.1016/j.jue.2017.10.003 
[5] Chen, K., & Wen, Y. (2017). The great housing boom of China. American Economic 
Journal: Macroeconomics, 9(2), 73–114. https://doi: 10.1257/mac.20140234 
[6] Corradin, S., & Popov, A. (2015). House prices, home equity borrowing, and 
entrepreneurship. The Review of Financial Studies, 28(8), 2399-2428. https://doi: 
10.1093/rfs/hhv020 
[7] Deng, Y., Girardin, E., & Joyeux, R. (2016). Fundamentals and the volatility of real 
estate prices in China: A sequential modelling strategy. China Economic Review, 48, 
205-222. 
[8] Disney, R., & Gathergood, J. (2009). Housing wealth, liquidity constraints and self-
employment. Labour Economics, 16(1), 79-88. https://doi: 
10.1016/j.labeco.2008.05.002 
[9] Dong, X., Zheng, S., & Kahn, M. (2020). The role of transportation speed in 
facilitating high skilled teamwork across cities. Journal of Urban Economics, 
103212. https://doi: 10.1016/j.jue.2019.103212 
[10] Fang, H., Gu, Q., Xiong, W., & Zhou, L. (2016) Demystifying the Chinese housing 
boom. NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 30(1), 105-166. https://doi: 10.1086/685953 
[11] Gan, L., Yin, Z., Jia, N., Xu, S., Ma, S., & Zheng, L. (2014). Data you need to know 
about China. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. https://doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-38151-5. 
[12] Glaeser, E. L., Huang, W., Ma, Y., & Shleifer, A. (2017). A real estate boom with 
Chinese characteristics. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31(1), 93-116. https://doi: 
10.1257/jep.31.1.93  
[13] Han, L. (2008). Hedging house price risk in the presence of lumpy transaction costs. 
Journal of Urban Economics, 64, 270-287. https://doi: 10.1016/j.jue.2008.01.002 
[14] Han, L. (2010). The effects of price uncertainty on housing demand: Empirical 
evidence from the U.S. Markets. Review of Financial Studies, 23, 3889-3928. 
https://doi: 10.1093/rfs/hhq088 
[15] Han, B., Han, L., & Zhu, G. (2018). Housing prices and fundamentals in a transition 
economy: The case of the Beijing market. International Economic Review, 59(3), 
1653-1677. https://doi: 10.1111/iere.12316 
 
 
25 
[16] He, C., Lu, J. & Qian, H. (2019). Entrepreneurship in China. Small Bus Econ 52, 
563–572. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-017-9972-5 
[17] Harding, J. P., & Rosenthal, S. S. (2017). Homeownership, housing capital gains and 
self-employment. Journal of Urban Economics, 99, 120-135. https://doi: 
10.1016/j.jue.2016.12.005 
[18] Hurst, E., & Lusardi, A. (2004). Liquidity constraints, household wealth, and 
entrepreneurship. Journal of Political Economy, 112(2), 319-347. https://doi: 
10.1086/381478 
[19] Jensen, T., Leth-Petersen, S. & Nanda, R. (2014), Housing collateral, credit 
constraints and entrepreneurship – Evidence from a mortgage reform, NBER 
Working Paper Series No 20583. 
[20] Kerr, S. P., Kerr, W. R., & Nanda, R. (2017). House money and entrepreneurship. 
Working paper, Harvard Business School. 
[21] Lazear, E. (2005). Entrepreneurship. Journal of Labor Economics, 23 (4), 649-680. 
https://doi: 10.1086/491605 
[22] Li, L., & Wu, X. (2014). Housing price and entrepreneurship in China. Journal of 
Comparative Economics, 42(2), 436-449. https://doi: 10.1016/j.jce.2013.09.001 
[23] Liu, Z. (2005). Institution and inequality: The hukou system in China. Journal of 
Comparative Economics, 33(1), 133-157. https://doi: 10.1016/j.jce.2004.11.001 
[24] Mian, A., & Sufi, A. (2011). House prices, home equity-based borrowing, and the 
US household leverage crisis. The American Economic Review, 101(5), 2132-2156. 
https://doi: 10.1257/aer.101.5.2132 
[25] Musso, A., Neri, S., & Stracca, L. (2011). Housing, consumption and monetary 
policy: How different are the US and the euro area?. Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 35(11), 3019-3041. https://doi: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2011.04.004 
[26] Nathanson, C. G., & Zwick, E. (2018). Arrested development: Theory and evidence 
of supply-side speculation in the housing market. The Journal of Finance, 73(6), 
2587-2633. https://doi: 10.1111/jofi.12719 
[27] Paciorek, A. (2013). Supply constraints and housing market dynamics. Journal of 
Urban Economics, 77, 11-26. https://doi: 10.1016/j.jue.2013.04.001 
[28] Schmalz, M. C., Sraer, D. A., & Thesmar, D. (2017). Housing collateral and 
entrepreneurship. The Journal of Finance, 72(1), 99-132. https://doi: 
10.1111/jofi.12468 
[29] Sinai, T., & Souleles, N. S. (2005). Owner-occupied housing as a hedge against rent 
risk. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120, 763–789. https://doi: 
10.1093/qje/120.2.763 
[30] State Council of P.R. China. (2017). Opinions of the state council on enhancing the 
implementation of the innovation-driven development strategy to further promote the 
deep development of mass entrepreneurship and innovation. Retrieved 
from http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-07/27/content_5213735.htm. 
 
 
26 
[31] Wang, C., Wang, N., & Yang, J. (2012). A unified model of entrepreneurship 
dynamics. Journal of Financial Economics, 106(1), 1-23. https://doi: 
10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.05.002 
[32] Wang, S. Y. (2012). Credit constraints, job mobility, and entrepreneurship: Evidence 
from a property reform in China. Review of Economics and Statistics, 94(2), 532-
551. https://doi: 10.1162/REST_a_00160 
[33] Wu, J., Gyourko, J., & Deng, Y. (2015). Real estate collateral value and investment: 
The case of China. Journal of Urban Economics, 86, 43-53. https://doi: 
10.1016/j.jue.2014.12.006 
[34] Wu, J., Gyourko, J., & Deng, Y. (2016). Evaluating the risk of Chinese housing 
markets: What we know and what we need to know. China Economic Review, 
39(39), 91-114. https://doi: 10.1016/j.chieco.2016.03.008 
[35] Yao, R. & Zhang. H. (2005). Optimal consumption and portfolio choices with risky 
housing and borrowing constraints. Review of Financial Studies, 18(1), 197-239. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhh007 
[36] Zhou, Z. (2016). Overreaction to policy changes in the housing market: Evidence 
from Shanghai. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 58, 26-41. https://doi: 
10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2016.02.004 
27 
 
 
Table 1 Summary statistics of urban respondents  
Mean Std Median Obs 
Entre 0.1642 0.3705 0 27278 
EntrePast 0.2518 0.4340 0 27279 
HaveHouse 0.8790 0.3261 1 27278 
NHouse 1.1034 0.6863 1 27242 
Age 52.8050 15.9890 54 27277 
Male 0.4644 0.4987 0 27278 
EduLow 0.5304 0.4991 1 27279 
EduMid 0.3448 0.4753 0 27279 
RuralHK 0.3342 0.4717 0 27273 
Marry 0.8147 0.3885 1 27131 
Risky 0.1023 0.3031 0 27269 
Unhealthy 0.1457 0.3528 0 27279 
Note. Variable values are based on the 2017 China Household Finance Survey. Entre is a dummy that 
equals 1 if a household runs a business, and 0 otherwise. EntrePast is a dummy that equals 1 if a 
household owns or previously owned a business, and 0 otherwise. HaveHouse is a dummy that equals 1 
if a household has a house, and 0 otherwise. NHouse is the number of house that a household has. Age 
is the respondent’s age. Male is a dummy if the respondent is male, and 0 otherwise. EduLow is a 
dummy that equals 1 if the respondent’s educational level is no higher than junior high school, and 0 
otherwise. EduMid is a dummy that equals 1 if the educational level lies between junior high school 
(not inclusive) and senior high schooling (inclusive), and 0 otherwise. RuralHK is a dummy that equals 
1 if a respondent has rural “hukou”, and 0 otherwise. Marry is a dummy that equals 1 if a respondent is 
married, and 0 otherwise. Risky is a dummy that equals 1 if a respondent prefers projects with above-
average risk and return, and 0 otherwise. Unhealthy is a dummy that equals 1 if a respondent is not as 
health as the peers of the same age, and 0 otherwise.  
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Table 2 Summary statistics of the panel data 
 Panel A Panel B 
 
Start Own HPIg Pro 
 Mean Mean Mean P25 P50 P75 Std Mean P25 P50 P75 Std 
2013 0.0111 0.7486 0.0526 0.0334 0.0480 0.0627 0.0360 0.1680 0.0400 0.1196 0.2658 0.2425 
2014 0.0131 0.7711 -0.0392 -0.0510 -0.0410 -0.0257 0.0217 0.1661 0.0428 0.1246 0.2260 0.2457 
2015 0.0143 0.7883 0.0112 -0.0179 0.0015 0.0211 0.0644 0.1961 0.0687 0.1573 0.2716 0.2516 
2016 0.0171 0.8081 0.0794 0.0120 0.0306 0.1209 0.1101 0.1678 0.0257 0.1439 0.2618 0.2449 
2017 0.0115 0.8257 0.0505 0.0292 0.0540 0.0719 0.0293 0.1494 0.0193 0.1331 0.2363 0.2119 
Note. Panel A reports the average value of Start and Own by year. For a year t, Start equals 1 if a household started a business in year t, and 0 otherwise (a household-year 
combination is deleted from our panel data if the household had a business that was started prior to that year); Own equals 1 if the household bought a house in the local city 
in year t-1 or earlier, and 0 otherwise. Panel B reports the cross-sectional mean, the 25th percentile, the median, the 75th percentile, and the standard deviation of HPIg and 
Pro in each year. 
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Table 3 Regression of entrepreneurship on house price growth and risk 
  (1) Logistic (2) OLS 
HPIg 3.8105* 0.0544 
 (1.9829) (0.0666) 
Pro -0.0294 0.0003 
 (0.6153) (0.0155) 
Own 0.1914 0.0009 
 (0.1260) (0.0024) 
HPIg*Own -4.5423*** -0.0851** 
 (1.2080) (0.0362) 
Pro*Own -0.5899* -0.0076 
 (0.3140) (0.0074) 
Age -0.0582*** -0.0009*** 
 (0.0040) (0.0001) 
Male 0.1934 0.0042* 
 (0.1295) (0.0024) 
EduLow 0.6542*** 0.0106*** 
 (0.1738) (0.0034) 
EduMid 0.3726* 0.0082** 
 (0.1924) (0.0039) 
RuralHK 0.1795 0.0061* 
 (0.1485) (0.0035) 
Risky 0.3131* 0.0105** 
 (0.1798) (0.0050) 
Unhealthy -0.1181 -0.0019 
 (0.2218) (0.0023) 
Z*HPIg Y Y 
Z*Pro Y Y 
City FE Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
Obs 65451 65451 
Note. This table reports the results of panel regressions where the dependent variable is the dummy 
Start that takes value 1 if a household started a business in the given year, and 0 otherwise. The 
independent variables include the previous year house price growth (HPIg) and house price risk (Pro) 
for the residence city of each household, as well as their interactions with the home-ownership dummy 
Own, and household characteristics (Z). City-fixed effects and year-fixed effects are also included. 
Given the sampling design of CHFS, the probability of each household being drawn is different. We 
follow the recommendation by CHFS to weight the observations by the variable “Swgt” provided in the 
CHFS database. The sample period is 2013-2017. Standard errors are clustered by city-Own and 
reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** stands for the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively.
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Table 4 Effect of house price growth and risk on entrepreneurship: IV approach 
Panel 1: First stage Panel 2: Second stage 
 (1) HPIg  (2) Pro  (3) Logistic (4) OLS 
ConUrban*NHPIg -1.6783 ConUrban*Npro -0.4311* HPIg 3.1889 0.0293 
 (1.1351)  (0.2471)  (6.4231) (0.1243) 
ConAll*NHPIg 8.1078*** ConAll*Npro 0.5958 Pro -11.4474 -0.2185 
 (2.5126)  (0.4978)  (10.2877) (0.2037) 
ConUrban*ConAll*NHPIg -2.0313 ConUrban*ConAll*Npro -1.7618*** Own 0.2206 0.0016 
 (2.2737)  (0.469)  (0.1404) (0.0027) 
ConUrban2*NHPIg 1.0526 ConUrban2*Npro 0.5662*** HPIg*Own -4.5608*** -0.0710** 
 (0.8467)  (0.1814)  (1.3509) (0.0272) 
ConAll2*NHPIg -11.9127*** ConAll2*Npro 1.8426** Pro*Own -0.8146** -0.0170* 
 (3.7631)  (0.7264)  (0.3512) (0.0089) 
City FE Y City FE Y Z*HPIg Y Y 
Year FE Y Year FE Y Z*Pro Y Y 
F-value 82.47 F-value 4383.56 City FE Y Y 
Obs 335 Obs 335 Year FE Y Y 
R2 62.52% R2 88.69% Obs 63579 63579 
Note. Panel 1 reports the results of the first stage IV regressions given by Equations (4a) and (4b). In Column (1) and Column (2), the dependent variables are HPIg and Pro, 
respectively. On the right-hand side, ConUrban measures the constraint of urban construction land in a given city; ConAll measures the constraint of both urban and rural 
construction land. NHPIg is national house price growth. Npro is national house price risk. Standard errors are clustered by city. Panel 2 reports the results of the second stage 
IV regressions. Standard errors are clustered by city-Own and reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** stands for the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively.
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Table 5 Subsample analysis by financial sophistication 
 Low-
Incorrect 
Low-
Correct 
High-
Incorrect 
High-
Correct 
HPIg 14.4783** -9.7524 3.8455 4.4548 
 (7.2796) (9.2550) (4.1426) (2.9714) 
Pro 9.1809*** -4.7575*** -0.6444 -0.0422 
 (3.2502) (1.4438) (1.6315) (0.8580) 
Own 0.4282 0.0444 -0.1031 0.3458* 
 (0.3486) (0.2621) (0.2201) (0.1956) 
HPIg*Own -6.6287** -0.4398 -3.6482** -5.5887*** 
 (2.9869) (3.4871) (1.7988) (1.4862) 
Pro*Own -0.4182 1.2589 -0.8781 -1.0113** 
 (1.2133) (1.2300) (0.7706) (0.4673) 
Z Y Y Y Y 
Z*HPIg Y Y Y Y 
Z*Pro Y Y Y Y 
City FE Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Obs 17439 15635 12204 20173 
Note. We sort households into four groups according to the respondents’ education level and the ability 
to correctly understand diversification benefit. Then we repeat the logistic regression (2) separately for 
the four groups. Observations are weighted in the way suggested by CHFS. Standard errors are 
clustered by city-Own and reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** stands for the significance 
level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
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Table 6 Optimism towards the housing market and investment intention  
 
 Intention to start a business  
Intention to 
buy a house 
 (1) All (2) Correct (3) Incorrect (4) High Edu. (5) Low Edu. (6) All 
Own -0.4535 -0.3062 -3.0401* -0.0200 -3.9369*** 1.6721*** 
  (0.4461) (0.3188) (1.8080) (0.4162) (1.4787) (0.0715) 
Optimism -1.3050** -0.9201*** -2.5069 -2.2890*** -2.0582 -0.9233*** 
  (0.6338) (0.1442) (4.1376) (0.5190) (2.0685) (0.2487) 
Own*Optimism -0.1608*** -0.1504 -0.9949** -0.2397 -0.9495** 0.5533*** 
  (0.0470) (0.3185) (0.4719) (0.2082) (0.4470) (0.0297) 
Z Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Z*Optimism Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs 935 581 354 577 358 935 
 
Note. This table reports the results of the logistic regression given in Equation (5) estimated using only Beijing households in the 2017 wave of CHFS. In Column (1) to 
Column (5), the dependent variable is Willstart. a dummy variable that equals 1 if a household intends to start a business, and 0 otherwise. Columns (6) report the results of 
the regression (5) except the dependent variable is replaced by Willbuy, a dummy variable that equals 1 if a household intends to buy a house, and 0 otherwise. In Column (2) 
and Column (3), we classify the households into two groups according the correctness of their answer to question H3115, and conduct a subsample analysis. In Column (4) 
and Column (5), we classify the households into two groups according their education level, and conduct a subsample analysis. Observations are weighted in the way 
suggested by CHFS. Standard errors are clustered by homeownership and reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** stands for the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively.
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Table 7 Entrepreneurship and house price growth of the connected city 
 (1) All (2) HPIgM0 (3) HPIgM>0 
HPIg 3.1997 1.5403 4.1562 
 (2.2219) (2.5602) (3.1579) 
HPIgM 0.9587 3.1005 5.1734 
 (1.3076) (5.4721) (3.7101) 
Pro -0.1878 -2.1326 1.3410 
 (0.8749) (2.0126) (1.2049) 
Own 0.0766 -0.1575 0.4459 
 (0.1277) (0.1696) (0.2889) 
HPIg*Own -4.3346*** -5.3705*** -2.1580 
 (1.2159) (1.4850) (1.3162) 
HPIgM*Own -2.3155* -7.1342 -6.9160** 
 (1.3989) (4.4346) (3.0813) 
Pro*Own -0.3755 -0.4730 -0.5985 
 (0.3427) (0.6353) (0.5416) 
Z Y Y Y 
Z*HPIg Y Y Y 
Z*Pro Y Y Y 
City FE Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y 
Obs 57971 29820 28151 
Note. This table reports the results of regression (6). For city c in year t, HPIgM is the residual from a 
regression of the house price growth rate of its connected city (i.e., the city that shares the largest 
number of high-speed rail trains with city c) on the house price growth rate of city c, using the 
historical data from 2006 to year t. Cities unconnected to HSR are dropped from regression (6). 
Observations are weighted in the way suggested by CHFS. Standard errors are clustered by city-Own. 
The symbols *, **, and *** stands for the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 8 Homeowners with houses in non-residence cities 
 (1) Logistic (2) OLS 
HPIg 6.1513*** 0.2482** 
 (1.9947) (0.0956) 
Pro 1.6015 0.0677 
 (1.1088) (0.0416) 
Own 0.7482*** 0.0275*** 
 (0.1789) (0.0083) 
HPIg*Own -3.6444*** -0.1486** 
 (1.3393) (0.0601) 
Pro*Own -0.6886 -0.0295 
 (0.5402) (0.0217) 
Z Y Y 
Z*HPIg Y Y 
Z*Pro Y Y 
City FE Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
Obs 13704 13704 
Note. This table reports the results of the baseline regression (2) estimated using the subsample 
consisting of only renters and homeowners whose houses are not in their residence cities. HPIg and 
Pro are the past one-year house price growth and house price risk of the residence city of each 
household. In Column (1), we use the logistic model. In Column (2), we use the linear probability 
model. Observations are weighted in the way suggested by CHFS. Standard errors are clustered by 
city-Own and reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** stands for the significance level of 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 9 Placebo tests: Randomly matched cities 
  
Coeff. StdErr t-value p-value 
Frac. of 
sig. (5%)  
Frac. of sig. 
& larger 
HPIgS -0.0413 0.0572 -0.7904 0.4345 0.097 0.000 
ProS -0.0028 0.0200 -0.1557 0.4965 0.069 0.026 
Own -0.0032 0.0022 -1.4652 0.2421 0.265 0.000 
HPIgS*Own -0.0103 0.0289 -0.3297 0.4644 0.058 0.003 
ProS*Own -0.0001 0.0073 -0.0460 0.4267 0.145 0.084 
Note. We match each city with another randomly chosen city by simulations. Then we repeat the linear 
probability model for the baseline regression in Equation (2) after replacing HPIg and Pro with the 
values for the matched city HPIgS and ProS. This analysis is repeated 1000 times. The table shows the 
average values across the 1000 regressions for the estimated coefficients, and the corresponding 
standard errors, t-values, as well as p-values. The column “Frac. of sig. (5%)” reports the fraction of 
cases among the 1000 regressions that a coefficient is significant at the 5% level. The last column 
reports the fraction of cases among the 1000 regressions that a coefficient is significant at 5% level and 
has the same or larger magnitude than the corresponding coefficient in Table 3 Column (2). 
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Appendix: List of variables 
 
Variable Definition 
Entre A dummy that equals 1 if a respondent’s 
household runs a business, and 0 otherwise 
HaveHouse A dummy that equals 1 if a respondent has a 
house, and 0 otherwise 
NHouse The number of house that a respondent has 
Age Survey respondent’s age in years 
Male A dummy that equals 1 if a respondent is male, 
and 0 otherwise 
EduLow A dummy that equals 1 if a respondent’s 
educational level is no higher than junior high 
school, and 0 otherwise 
EduMid A dummy that equals 1 if the educational level 
lies between junior high school (not inclusive) 
and senior high schooling (inclusive), and 0 
otherwise 
RuralHK A dummy that equals 1 if a respondent has rural 
“hukou”, and 0 otherwise  
Marry A dummy that equals 1 if a respondent is 
married, and 0 otherwise 
Risky A dummy that equals 1 if a respondent prefers 
projects with above average risk and return, and 
0 otherwise 
Unhealthy A dummy that equals 1 if a respondent is not as 
health as peers of the same age, and 0 otherwise 
Start A dummy that equals 1 if the household starts a 
business in year t, and 0 otherwise 
Own A dummy that equals 1 if the household bought 
a house in the local city in year t-1 or earlier, and 
0 otherwise 
HPIg Annual house price growth  
QRHPIg Year-on-year house price growth rate, deflated 
by CPI 
RGDPg Year-on-year GDP growth rate, deflated by CPI 
Pro A measure of house price risk defined as the 
sensitivity of a city’s house price growth to local 
GDP growth, obtained as the regression 
coefficient of QRHPIg on RGDPg 
Optimism The degree of a Beijing respondent's optimism 
towards the local housing market over the next 
year 
Willstart A dummy that equals 1 if the respondent intends 
to start a business, and 0 otherwise 
Willbuy A dummy that equals 1 if the respondent intends 
to buy a house, and 0 otherwise 
 
